Rethinking Ethnicity
Majority groups and dominant minorities

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Chapter 9
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"Citizenship, immigration and ethnic hegemony in Japan."
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Introduction

The rapid economic reconstruction of Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s is to a significant extent attributable to the massive deployment of foreign labour in heavy manufacturing industries. Governments in this region commonly adopted policies permitting guest workers to reunite with their families in the host society. As a result, by the 1980s these societies had witnessed permanent settlement of large numbers of immigrants and the resultant growth of diverse ethnic communities within their territories. In an effort to incorporate these non-citizen populations, including refugees and asylum seekers, into their legal and political structures, the governments have gradually expanded the social, economic and political rights available to their non-citizen, permanent residents. Consequently, by the 1990s citizenship has ceased to be a factor determining eligibility for most public services, economic activities and political participation at local levels. In post-national Western Europe, therefore, rights of immigrants have been increasingly determined by residence rather than citizenship (Soysal 1994).1

In a similar vein, since the 1960s the large numbers of foreigners working in the manufacturing and construction industries in Asia's newly industrialised countries/economies, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong, have contributed greatly to their rapid economic development (e.g. ASEAN Economic Bulletin 1995). By the 1990s Japan, Korea and Taiwan had imported foreign labour in order to boost their increasingly labour-short industries. With more than five million migrant workers, East and Southeast Asia thus became one of the world's most active sites of international migration (Yamanaka 1999). In sharp contrast to Western Europe, however, Asian host governments have commonly adopted policies that rotate a pool of temporary workers with little concern for their labour, human and citizenship rights (Battistella 2002). Migration scholars have explained that many Asian governments still engage in the process of post-colonial nation-state building as a result of which they tend to construct and maintain sharp boundaries between citizens and non-citizens (Soysal 1994: 150; Castles and Davidson 2000). Some Asian states emphasise 'Asian values' in order to
uphold collective values while dismissing individual and human rights as 'Western values' (Bauer and Bell 1999).

Japan occupies a unique position between post-national Europe and post-colonial Asia regarding its immigration policy and citizenship rights for migrant workers. The country stands out, on the one hand, as the only Asian coloniser in the pre-World War II period and 'the only longstanding Asian democracy' in the post-World War II period (Castles and Davidson 2000: 196). Having achieved rapid economic reconstruction and development, post-war Japan resembles Western Europe in its high technological and living standards, large middle-class population and solid nation-state foundation. On the other hand, unlike its European counterparts, Japan has adopted a policy to receive only skilled foreigners, while unofficially admitting more than half a million de facto guest workers (as discussed below). Because they lack citizenship, most of these newcomers are denied rights to family reunification and access to public services. In its exclusive policy on immigration and citizenship, Japan resembles its Asian post-colonial neighbours. The contradiction between Japan's advanced capitalism and its obsolete immigration policies requires explanation.

In this chapter, I focus on ethno-historical forces as a possible explanation for Japan's efforts to maintain sharp boundaries between citizens and non-citizens despite the fact that its economy benefits greatly from foreign workers. In addition to these newcomers, like all nation-states, Japan contains within its population a number of long-term and indigenous ethnic minorities with distinct histories and cultures. This is a result of nation-building efforts since the 1860s that forced ethnic minorities – Koreans, Chinese, Ainu, Okinawans, Burakumin and others – to assimilate into the national culture and polity dominated by the majority Japanese population who comprise the country's long-established ethnie, to use Anthony Smith's term. According to him, an ethnie is defined as 'a named unit of population with myths of common ancestry, shared memories and culture, an association with a homeland and sentiments of “social solidarity”' (Smith 1999: 191).

By tracing the history of nation building, ethnic hegemony and what I term 'disposable citizenship' during the two distinct periods before and after World War II, I investigate how the ethnic nationalism that defines Japan as an ethnically homogeneous nation has contributed to the country's political and economic development in times of war and peace. The analysis demonstrates a close association between definitions of who belongs to the ethnie and who belongs to the nation and territory. These definitions are alterable, however, as national goals and boundaries shift with the rapid changes in international politics and economy. In the last section of the chapter, therefore, I discuss recent challenges to the Japanese myth of ethnic homogeneity in the age of global capitalism and migration, based on my ten years of research on a large influx of 'Third World' immigrant workers in Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture.

Inclusive citizenship in a multi-ethnic empire: 1868–1945

'Modern Japan was characterized by (multiethnic) imperialism, not (monoethnic) nationalism' (Lip 2001: 112). By the turn of the twentieth century, as a result of victory in two successive wars Japan had achieved two external colonies – Taiwan in 1895 and Korea in 1910 – outside of its traditional territory composed of its four major islands plus the Ryukyu (now Okinawa Islands). From this period until the end of World War II, Japan was a multiethnic empire and home to diverse ethnic minorities who altogether accounted for 30 per cent of the then total 100 million people in the territory ruled by Japan (Oguma 1995: 4). How to manage and control this unprecedented ethnic diversity was therefore a topic intensely debated by intellectuals and political leaders throughout the imperial period (Oguma 1995, 1998). From the 1868 Meiji Restoration until the territorial expansion of 1910, the country had already been undergoing rapid social, economic and political changes, transforming itself from an agrarian feudal society into a modern industrial nation. During these four decades, national leaders made concerted efforts to bring together the then loosely connected population to participate in the national project of constructing a new modern nation and economy (Gellner 1983). Europe and the United States had provided them with advanced technologies and models of judicial and political institutions. These were adopted by Japanese in a way that enabled them to fit into their own traditional cultural milieu and indigenous knowledge system. Under constant threat from Western colonialism, throughout this period the national leaders also made every attempt to raise educational standards, promote industrialisation, facilitate transportation and communication, strengthen military power and uplift patriotic ideology.

In the early stage of forging the new nation, the Meiji government engaged in what Smith (1999: 194) calls a process of 'vernacular mobilisation' in order to unite the population under a single national identity. The new state required grassroots support for its nation-building efforts. Thus began the political process of inventing spiritual leadership, often by returning to the roots of the ethnic community. In its first step, the Meiji state revived the ancient emperor system, replacing the feudal Shogunate system by designating the emperor as the divine ruler and the rest as his subjects. The Meiji Constitution (promulgated in 1899) invested sovereignty in the emperor whose power was based on ancient myths about the origins of the nation and the unbroken line of emperors (Brownlee 1997: 7). In the second step, the government institutionalised belief in the myths of such ancestors and their pristine past through education, religion and other means of persuasion. Shinto (literally the way of deities) was regarded as the national religion because of its close association with the imperial household. Over many years, Shinto priests and scholars created a series of 'ancient' rituals, ceremonies and pageants engaged in by the emperor himself (Fujitani 1996). Historians studied the myths, legends and folklore in search
nation was founded. In the 710s, at the dawn of the nation, they were compiled into two volumes as the nation's first histories, Kojiki (Record of Ancient Matters, 712) and Nihon Shoki (Chronicles of Japan, 720). The two books, written in Chinese characters, tell stories of nation-building by a deity couple, Izanagi and Izanami, and their numerous descendants (Matsumae 1974; Tooyama 2001). Especially important among them was the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, who sent her Heavenly Grandchild down from the Plain of High Heaven to the Central Land of Reed Plains (Japan). It was believed that some generations after the descent of the Heavenly Grandchild, the first human emperor, Jimmu (divine warrior), conquered many clans and groups that had resisted his reign. He then unified the nation and declared his ascension to the imperial throne in Kashihara, near Nara, in 660 BC (Brownlee 1997: 2–7). In this foundation myth, the divine emperor and his descendants had been benevolent rulers of their subjects, including those they had conquered. Under the universal and fatherly love of the emperors, all people, regardless of their origins, were treated impartially as being the emperors' children. As such, they were able to assimilate easily into Japanese society and culture. The mythical Japan thus founded comprised not only Japanese—the dominant majority—but also large numbers of people of diverse and mixed ancestry, therefore constituting a multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan nation (Oguma 1995).

Until 1945, historians commonly adopted a view, based on these ancient myths, that Japanese were people of hybrid or mixed ethnicity whose ancestors had migrated from various parts of East and South-east Asia in the pre-historic period. Since the 1910s this view accommodated conveniently to the fact that Japan was a multi-ethnic empire comprising diverse ethnic groups with distinct histories and cultures. The fictitious blood-ties among the emperor's subjects provided a link to establish brotherhood between Japanese and non-Japanese groups (Oguma 1995). In this 'imagined' family state, the emperor was the household head, the majority Japanese were the first son, and colonial nationals were their 'younger' brothers. Furthermore, the alleged superiority of Japanese culture provided the state with the justification to force its assimilation policies upon non-Japanese so that they would improve their 'inferior' cultures. At the outset of the rapid industrialisation and territorial expansion in the 1910s and 1920s, the ideology of a family state thus contributed significantly to the development of the concept of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere—a racialised 'imagined community' (Anderson 1983) dominated by Japan—in the Far East on the basis of 'shared' ancestry, myths and culture (Armstrong 1989; Weiner 1994). The ideology of social homogeneity also helped the state and the national majority to ignore the reality of the Japanese Empire in which the 100 million population was deeply divided according to ethnicity, class, region, history and gender.

A contradiction between the state goal and the real life of different peoples was apparent in ethnic and class relations. Despite the official rhetoric of equality among different groups, throughout the imperial period the state adopted a policy of 'separate but equal', granting colonial subjects fewer rights than Japanese. Bureaucrats in an administrative office recorded on the household registration card ethnic Japanese as Naichijin (inner territory people) and others as Gaichijin (outer territory people). Citizenship rights were weighted accordingly. Although Koreans were Japanese nationals, the Governor-General of Korea controlled migration of Koreans to and from the inner territory (Japan), whereas citizens of Japanese origin were not under such control (Yamawaki 2000: 39). In the Korean Peninsula, Koreans did not have suffrage rights, whereas those in the inner territory did and even had the right to be elected representatives. In the 1920s and 1930s, however, most Koreans in Japan were unskilled labourers who had migrated in search of economic opportunities not available in their homeland now under foreign rule. By 1925, 150,000 Korean men and women worked in jobs shunned by Japanese in such labour-intensive and often dangerous industries as mining, construction, arms and other manufacturing. This number had risen dramatically to 800,000 by 1937, the year Japan declared war on China. Poor and uneducated, the migrant workers in tattered clothes, living in filthy tenements, were an easy scapegoat for the fears and anxieties widespread among members of the Japanese working class (Weiner 1994). At the height of the Pacific War (1942–5), more than 2 million Korean Japanese nationals became an important source of conscripted, and later forced, labour working under extremely harsh and brutal conditions (ibid.).

Exclusive citizenship in a mono-ethnic nation, 1945–89

In prewar Japan, everyone said that Yamato Japanese people are hybrid people (zasshu minzoku), and mixed people (kongo minzoku) ... But, rather strangely, in the postwar period, beginning with progressive intellectuals, people began to say that Japan is monoethnic. There is no basis for this.

(Kamishima, cited by Lie 2001: 137)

This statement by the political scientist Jiro Kamishima, who lived in both pre- and post-war Japan, points to the complete reversal in intellectual discourse and public views about the ethnic composition of the Japanese population from pre- to post-war periods. This can be partly explained by the fact that Japan had lost colonies as a result of defeat in World War II and the subsequent denationalisation of former colonial residents in the country. The discursive shift from multi-ethnicism to mono-ethnicism was
also closely related to ethnic and cultural nationalism that arose between the late 1940s and 1950s as part of national efforts to rebuild the nation as a peaceful, democratic country with a prosperous economy. By the late 1960s, when Japan was acclaimed as the country with the highest rate of economic growth, Japanese nationality provided its citizens with a source of ethnic pride. In the 1970s and 1980s, a new economic and cultural nationalism emerged in which citizens in all walks of life – intellectuals, politicians, businessmen and ordinary folk – were engaged in ‘Nihonjinron’ (discussions of the Japanese) in search of a new identity suitable to their now affluent ‘First World’ country.

Japan’s surrender in 1945 liberated its Korean colonial subjects, the majority of whom soon repatriated to their homeland. One-quarter of them (600,000), however, chose to remain in Japan for political, economic and familial reasons. With the looming threat of war in the Korean Peninsula, their repatriation efforts were postponed further (Lie 2001: 197). For seven years, between 1945 and 1952, the Japanese government regarded its former nationals of colonial origin (Gaichijn) as foreigners, excluding them from political participation and requiring them to register as foreign residents (Onuma 1993; Tanaka 1995). In 1951, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty with the United States with the result that the country was restored to full independence and re-entered the international community. In April of the following year, when the Treaty took effect, the Ministry of Justice issued a communication by which the 600,000 Koreans were formally deprived of Japanese citizenship. In 1950, when the 1899 Nationality Law was revised, Japan had retained the principle of *jus sanguinis* (law of blood) through paternal lineage as defining Japanese citizenship. As a result, descendants of non-Japanese nationals, including Koreans, are to this day defined by law as foreigners no matter how long or over how many generations they have lived in Japan (Miyajima 1997: 126). In 1965, the Japan–Korea Peace Treaty imposed South Korean nationality on most ethnic Koreans in Japan, and granted permanent resident status to Koreans of the first and second generations of residence in Japan. By 1990, the Korean population had increased to 700,000, constituting Japan’s largest foreign population. From 1945 until the early 1980s, the loss of Japanese citizenship had denied Koreans most of the benefits of public services to which Japanese citizens are entitled, including national health insurance and workers’ pensions – this despite their obligation to pay taxes on their earnings (Miyajima 1997: 127).

In 1952, at the outset of Japan’s post-war economic reconstruction, the denationalisation of 600,000 Koreans had reinforced the post-war Japanese myth of ethnic homogeneity in the country of then 100 million (Onuma 1993; Oguma 1995). The Showa Constitution (promulgated in 1946) renounced war while, in Article I, defining the emperor to be ‘the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power’. In reconstructing the
printed and broadcast materials led people to engage in Nihonjinron discussion, examining Japanese origins, identity, customs, behaviour and ways of thinking, which were in sharp contrast to those of any other society. Most of these media productions were non-scientific and aimed at the lay public, but Nihonjinron's surging popularity suggested its strong cultural appeal to all categories of Japanese. According to Yoshino (1998: 16), the Nihonjinron is characterised by its holistic 'culturalistic' approach that is compatible with 'racialist' thinking, in which a particular culture belongs to a particular 'race'. Such a cultural, racial (ethnic) and national discourse is deeply embedded in the historical notion of Japan as a family nation in which blood-ties, beliefs and ethnicity were conflated to generate a strong sense of oneness (ibid.: 19).

In parallel with this ethno-cultural, inward-looking construction of nationhood, increased international contact also gave rise to respect for individual rights, tolerance of cultural difference, and universal human rights. At the state level, this change was inseparable from the rapid economic success that had elevated Japan to become one of the most influential nations in world affairs. One result of this global recognition was the fact that Japan became signatory to many international conventions on human rights proposed by the United Nations and other international organisations (Takafuji 1991; Gurowitz 1999).11 These conventions are based on the principle of equality for all nationalities and races, and between genders (Takafuji 1991). Once it has signed an international convention, a government is obliged to make every effort, including legislation, to eradicate inequalities built into institutional arrangements in the country. Among the international conventions ratified by Japan during the post-war era, the International Convention on the Status of Refugees and Protocol (ratified in 1991; Tanaka 1995). As a result of its ratification, the Japanese government was obliged to revise domestic laws by which foreign, mostly Korean, residents had been treated unequally, especially in the areas of social security and welfare. Consequently, Japanese nationality was no longer required for eligibility to obtain the benefits of social services, including health insurance, worker pensions and public housing (Miyajima 1997).12 Subsequently, the 1985 ratification of the International Convention on Eliminating All Forms of Discrimination against Women led the government in 1984 to revise the Nationality Act, so that women became equal to men in determining the nationality of their children.13

Challenge to ethnic hegemony in the age of global migration: from 1990 onwards

The arrival of the age of global migration in the late 1980s opened a new chapter in Japan's ethno-national history. Its growing labour needs increasingly challenged the myth of a monoethnic population. As migrant workers arrived, not only from East, South-east and South Asia but also from South America, the reality of a 'multiethnic Japan' could no longer be denied (Lie 2001). The 1990 Revised Immigration Law made it officially illegal to hire unskilled foreigners, while it opened new channels through which migrants could legally enter, work and live in Japan. A result is a sudden influx of more than 200,000 Brazilians of Japanese ancestry and their families who have arrived in many industrial cities throughout Japan and rapidly developed their ethnic communities replete with Brazilian culture and enterprises (Yamanaka 2000a). This has resulted in increasing everyday contacts between these 'foreigners' and ordinary Japanese. Consequently in these locales, as citizens and municipal governments struggle to cope with problems of face-to-face interactions with the new local residents, there has emerged a dialectical social process in which Japanese of all levels are engaged in daily negotiation to construct the emerging new national identity. In this process, they are increasingly confronted with the notion of universal equality among all residents regardless of nationality and ethnicity. As a result, 'ethnic' citizenship, rigidly defined on the basis of national membership, is challenged to expand its boundary in order to include these newcomers who have heretofore been denied rights because they lack citizenship.

Between the late 1960s and early 1970s, Japan's rapid and prolonged economic boom required unprecedented amounts of labour, which caused severe labour shortages. Although foreign labour was requested by employers as a way to alleviate the labour shortages, the government advocated other solutions.14 These included: increasing productivity by introduction of automation, exporting production to low-wage countries (especially in Asia), mobilising unutilised labour (e.g., women and elderly), allowing inflation to increase, and permitting the transfer of income from capital to labour (Bartram 2000: 19). Consequently, as a result of having virtually avoided importation of labour for four decades, Japan became an anomaly among highly industrialised countries with similar problems of labour supply during the post-war economic boom. Most of the others had chosen to rely heavily on foreign labour as a solution (Bartram 2000: 15). By the mid-1980s, however, all signs pointed to the fact that Japan was attracting global immigrant workers (Yamanaka 1993). From the late 1980s to early 1990s, no less than 200,000 unskilled foreigners (mostly from neighbouring Asian countries) entered the country's labour force illegally by over-staying their short-term visas issued to tourists, students, business personnel, company trainees and entertainers (Morita and Sassen 1994).

Faced with the dilemma of how to ameliorate the shortage of labour, on the one hand, and maintain social and class homogeneity on the other, the Ministry of Justice came up with a solution. In June 1990, it implemented the Revisied Immigration Law without changing its central provision that had restricted imported labour to skilled occupations. The revision entailed the introduction of the following two measures designed
to increase the supply of inexpensive labour while stemming the tide of unwanted foreigners (Cornelius 1994; Weiner and Hanami 1998). First, the Revised Immigration Law made employers of illegal workers subject to criminal penalties: two years' imprisonment or a maximum fine of two million yen ($20,000). Second, it established a new ‘long-term resident’ (teiju) visa category, exclusively for non-citizens with Japanese ancestry (Nikkeijin) up to the third generation. This new category allowed Nikkeijin, regardless of nationality, to stay for up to three years in Japan with no restriction on their socio-economic activities (Yamanaka 1996). Their spouses and children were also permitted to stay, usually up to one year. Visas of both the Nikkeijin and their families in this category could be easily renewed, as a result of which many of the immigrants remained beyond the initially designated periods. The change in the law had an immediate effect on migration flows into Japan. In 1990, the year the law was implemented, there was an influx, over the next five years, of more than 200,000 Nikkeijin immigrant workers, mostly from Brazil where the largest overseas Japanese population lived. The same law, however, closed the door to other unskilled workers, most of whom were Asians without Japanese ancestry (e.g., Yamanaka 2000b). Many Japanese employers, threatened by criminal penalties, discharged unauthorised workers and replaced them with Nikkeijin and company trainees, the other legal category of migrant workers.

A case study of changing ethnic hegemony from Hamamatsu

The section will comprise a case study I conducted from 1998 to 2003 in Hamamatsu City, where most Japanese have faced day-to-day interaction with mostly Japanese Brazilian immigrants, following their sudden and large influx since 1990. It provides data from which to analyse dynamic but contradictory social processes in the changing ethnic hegemony of Japanese as they realise that authorised foreigners are also ‘local citizens’ (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000) who deserve and can demand legal rights equal to those of Japanese citizens.

Hamamatsu, a city of half a million located 257 kilometres south-west of Tokyo, is one of the many cities that since the late 1980s have received an influx of migrant workers, both authorised and unauthorised. As home to the headquarters of such large manufacturing corporations as Suzuki, Yamaha and Honda, the city has attracted skilled foreigners as well as thousands of unskilled workers including both authorised Japanese Brazilians and unauthorised Asians throughout the 1990s. By 2001, the city was home to 12,000 Brazilians and 8,000 other registered foreign nationals who together accounted for 3.5 per cent of the city's total population. Ethnographic and sociological analyses of Brazilian immigration in Hamamatsu and other cities have commonly reported systematic ‘differential exclusion’ (Castles 1997: 115–17) of Brazilian immigrant workers at the hands of Japanese industries, employers, brokers, workers and bureaucracy (Yamanaka 1996, 2000a; Roth 2002; Tsuda 2003). According to these studies, upon arrival in Japan, the majority of working-age Brazilian men and women have been employed on assembly lines and shop floors in factories producing and assembling automobile parts, electric appliances and other manufactured goods. They have usually signed short-term contracts with labour brokers (assen or haken gyosha), who in turn dispatched them to the factories where they worked as temporary labourers separated from the formal labour force (Roth 2002). The formal labour force comprises Japanese (male) employees who can look forward to permanent employment. As this suggests, most Brazilian workers, despite their authorised status, lack job security, labour union membership, unemployment insurance, old-age pension and the wide variety of fringe benefits to which Japanese permanent employees are entitled. Because the majority of them lack Japanese citizenship, they are also ineligible for the National Health Insurance Plan. In the housing market, Brazilians routinely encounter discrimination by landlords. As a result, job brokers often sublet apartments to their foreign employees during the period of their employment contracts. The sublet system severely restricts foreigners' choice of residence, and consequently limits their occupational mobility. In children's education, Portuguese-speaking Brazilian children enrolled in Japanese public schools often find it difficult to understand Japanese instructions. Consequently, many of them soon drop out of school to work in factories or they roam the streets, remaining unschooled.

The contradictory ethnic and class selection criteria employed by the government in seeking to attract inexpensive Brazilian labour to Japan underline the discriminatory treatment these workers experience (Yamanaka 1996). By law, Japanese ancestry has privileged ethnic Brazilians over other foreign workers by offering them long-term residence visas irrespective of occupation. The majority of them, however, work as temporary manual workers in factories. According to Castles (1984: 12), guest worker systems embody institutional discrimination designed to recruit and control such temporary migrant workers. For local industries, the advantage of hiring migrant workers from the Third World rests on their vulnerability as a result of their dire economic need, non-citizen status, linguistic handicaps, and unfamiliarity with local labour customs. Foreign workers provide a cheap alternative labour pool that carries out essential manual jobs shunned by Japanese. Their work requires physical strength and on-the-job experience but no complex technical or communication skills. It exposes them to danger and stress while providing no prospect of promotion and none of the fringe benefits their Japanese co-workers enjoy. In times of recession, they are the first to be laid off, while Japanese co-workers' jobs and wages remain secure. Brazilian workers of Japanese ancestry are no exception to this kind of systematic labour discrimination.
My research in Hamamatsu suggests that responses to the emergence of this new but marginalised ethnic community on the part of both the municipal government and the public have been complex and often contradictory.

On the one hand, the systematic exclusion of Brazilians as described above has reinforced the cold reception they receive from Hamamatsu citizens. Discrimination commonly occurs in such public spaces as stores and restaurants that serve immigrant customers. Having experienced difficulty in communicating with foreign customers, the majority of whom are Portuguese-speaking Brazilians, some merchants become reluctant to serve them. The mass media have paid a great deal of attention to police reports of increasing conflicts, violence and crimes attributed to foreigners (Herbert 1992). These reports have further reinforced the public perception that foreigners are not only cultural strangers but also troublemakers, even criminals.

Such social and political processes of constructing 'foreignness', as opposed to perceived 'Japaneseness', in Hamamatsu culminated in a lawsuit charging discrimination brought in August 1998 by Brazilian television journalist Ana Bortz, the non-Nikkeijin wife of a Japanese Brazilian newspaper reporter, against a local merchant. Two months earlier, Bortz had entered a downtown jewellery store whereupon the owner, Takahisa Suzuki, asked her nationality. When Bortz revealed her Brazilian nationality, Suzuki pointed to a home-made sign in Japanese, 'No foreigners allowed in this store', and demanded that she leave. When Bortz refused, protesting that exclusion of foreigners from the store is a violation of their human rights, the proprietor called the police who arrived soon but left without taking any action. Bortz then left as well, but subsequently sued the owner for discrimination on the basis of race and nationality. In the absence of any applicable Japanese law, she cited the authority of the International Convention on Eliminating All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which Japan had ratified in 1995.

Fourteen months later, in October 1999, a District Court judge astounded the nation when he ruled that (1) in view of Japan's ratification of the International Convention, its provisions serve as the standard by which racial discrimination must be determined in Japan; and (2) because its provisions provide the grounds upon which Japanese Civil Law takes effect, the victim is entitled to compensation. The defendant filed no appeal and full compensation was awarded. My research on the social impact that this unprecedented court ruling had on citizens' perceptions of foreigners suggests that many of them thought the defendant Suzuki did the 'right' thing in order to protect his business from a foreigner – a potential criminal (Yamanaka 2003a). They also expressed vague fears generated by the fact that a foreigner (Bortz) had dared to challenge Japanese authority and hegemony in a Japanese city. In reply to a question of how strained relationships between Japanese and Brazilians could be improved, the majority of my informants cited communication – not law and litigation – as the best method for ending discrimination.

In their view, both Japanese and foreigners should try hard to understand cultural differences and to establish common rules for dealing with them. They believed that the use of law and litigation to enforce racial equality would result in the mere appearance of racial harmony and would therefore be counterproductive. The long-term impact of the court ruling on public perceptions and attitudes towards ethnic minorities is yet to be seen in Hamamatsu. It is evident at this point, however, that the issue of racial equality and human rights that was emphasised in the court ruling remains a remote concept to the majority of citizens who have never doubted their entitlement to ethnic (national) hegemony in the Japanese territory, thus accepting discrimination against foreigners.

On the other hand, some Hamamatsu citizens, having witnessed the legal and social barriers faced by foreign workers and residents, have responded with empathy for their plight and have been moved to action. Small but dedicated groups of such citizens have formed grassroots organisations to meet the needs of foreigners whose lack of citizenship has denied them public services, legal rights and political participation. Their voluntary activities include not only providing the foreigners with information and services but also carrying out cultural and educational projects jointly with immigrant groups and organisations (Yamanaka 2003b). Citizen volunteers also negotiate with the local administration for immigrant rights, and they campaign to raise multicultural awareness among the general public.

Underlying this unprecedented surge of community activities in Hamamatsu is a broad and growing emphasis on self-governance at the grassroots throughout Japan. Arising from the ashes of the 1995 Kobe earthquake, this new civil society movement stresses voluntarism, public interest, non-profit, and non-governmental organisations (Tajiri 2001: 19). In contrast to traditional activism serving the interests of specific neighbourhoods, and the 1960s' radical citizens movement for social justice and equality, recent community activism has undertaken to address broad societal concerns such as ageing, disability, health, environment, migration, human rights, etc. Ordinary citizens, often middle-class women, volunteer their efforts in networking, providing services and advocating the rights of those who are disadvantaged because of existing legal, institutional and cultural barriers. Under increasing budgetary constraints coupled with rapidly ageing populations, local governments have been inclined to delegate policy projects to non-governmental and non-profit-making organisations (Sakuma 2001: 147–8). In this age of economic liberalism and power decentralisation, the partnership between local governments and non-governmental organisations has been consistent with the interests of the national government as well.

My research demonstrates that Hamamatsu citizens' grassroots activities comprise a basis for the small-scale but tangible form of transnationalisation now occurring in this non-metropolitan city where, before 1990, most
citizens rarely had contact with non-citizens (Yamanaka 2003b). Citizens and immigrants have begun to interact with one another at work and in community activities, as a result of which the two parties, in the absence of shared national citizenship, are developing a sense of shared ‘global citizenship’ (Soysal 1994; Lister 1997). That is, by carrying out responsibilities and projects together, they are in the process of achieving a collective identity and a shared societal history that crosses national boundaries. They have thus triggered ‘grassroots transnationalisation’, a form of social transformation in which everyday practices and relations of ordinary people generate ‘multiple and counter-hegemonic powers’ for promoting equality and multiculturalism (Mahler 1998: 64). At the national level, my research also points to the growing and glaring contradictions between governmental immigration policy and practice in Japan. One such contradiction is the significant gap between the national government and local governments in their policies relating to the incorporation of immigrants into the political, social and legal structure of the state (Tsuda and Cornelius forthcoming; Kondo 2003). Local governments, such as that of Hamamatsu, are becoming responsive to their immigrants’ needs and interests, and have moved towards incorporating them into the local polity. The government of Japan, by contrast, remains indifferent to such policies because it denies that Japan is a country of immigration and has therefore adopted an immigration law that merely regulates border control while ignoring the plight of immigrants. As a result, local administrations and concerned citizens are left to struggle for practical solutions to the mounting problems associated with immigrant health, housing, education, culture and human rights within their own jurisdictions in the context of severe budgetary constraints and limited resources at the grassroots. Without governmental efforts to build a consensus at the national level, local autonomy is prevented from being achieved, while voluntarism is inadequate to address them. Solutions to these problems require fundamental changes in national policies defining identity and citizenship.

Conclusion

This comparative analysis of Japanese citizenship in the process of nation-state building during the pre-war and post-war periods highlights the critical importance of the ‘ethnic’ component in defining who belongs to the state. It also reveals the great discretion exercised by the state in constructing the boundaries between citizen and non-citizen at each historical turning point. For more than a century, the core ideology of a family state (one nation and one people) has shaped and reshaped Japanese national identity according to national goals and strategies in order to attain those goals in the rapidly changing world of politics, economy and demography. In times of war and patriotism, the ‘imperial’ Japanese state broadened the boundary of nationality in order to mobilise colonial subjects into its labour force and military. In times of peace and prosperity, the ‘democratic’ state constricted the boundary to exclude former colonial nationals from political and social participation. In this period of global capitalism, the ‘neo-liberal’ state has redefined Japanese ethnicity to include foreign nationals of Japanese descent in the shrinking labour force, but has stopped far short of including them within the political and ethnic community.

This repeated pattern of redrawing the boundary of citizenship throughout Japanese modern history clearly suggests that the state has negotiated and manipulated the boundary of who belongs to the nation-state. It also indicates that the dominant ethnic Japanese have accepted uncritically the changing definition of ethnicity and nationality. The fluid and ‘disposable’ nature of citizenship, then, suggests the possibility of an expanded ‘civic’ component in the redefinition of Japanese citizenship, in response to the growing emphasis on universal human rights in the increasingly deterritorialised world. Such change may occur in Japan in the near future, but only if the state and the majority Japanese accept the fact that Japan is and has been multiethnic, and that it has in the long run benefited greatly from its ethnic diversity. The case study of Hamamatsu described above indicates that the paths to building a multiethnic community are not smooth but rocky with much social and political tension embedded in the process of breaking the old myths and creating the new. In this process, international law and grassroots activism have proven to be two powerful new forces in broadening the ideological scope and legal frameworks of citizenship towards including civic and participatory definitions. More research will be necessary to predict how and to what extent these two forces—one from ‘above’ and the other from ‘below’—can bring significant change to the century-old ethnic nationalism that has defined who is, and who is not, Japanese.

Notes

Soysal (1994) has analysed the incorporation of guest workers and their dependants who have become permanent residents into the state’s political structure since the 1970s in six Western European countries (Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, France, Switzerland and Britain). Guest worker populations from non-EU member countries, such as Turkey and those in North Africa, however, still face many forms of exclusion in the political, social and economic institutions in receiving countries, while refugees are largely excluded from most political institutions (Piper 1998).

2 The name ‘Yamato’ is frequently used to designate the majority Japanese (e.g. Liw 2001: 3). According to Bestor (2001: 1140), it is used by archaeologists and historians to distinguish Japanese artistic genres from their Chinese counterparts. In contemporary usage, it is strongly associated with the imperial and military system. Today, most Japanese call themselves Nihonjin or Nipponjin (Japanese people) deriving from Nihon or Nippon (Japan), meaning ‘origin from the sun’.

3 Throughout Japanese history until the Meiji Restoration, emperors were dominated by a succession of court families and military (samurai) rulers, although state authority was in theory concentrated in the hands of the emperor (Lock 1993: 105).
The 1925 Universal Manhood Suffrage Act enfranchised men over the age of 25, including Koreans living in Japan. In the national and local elections between 1929 and 1936, 46 out of 153 Korean candidates were elected to public office (Weiner 1994: 149).

For example, in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, approximately 6,000 Koreans were massacred by the Japanese military, police and populace (Yamawaki 2000: 45).

The San Francisco Peace Treaty had formally ended the seven-year occupation of Japan by the United States. In April 1952, when the Treaty took effect, the Japanese government exercised its sovereignty by legally defining former colonial citizens as foreigners, thereby completing their exclusion from membership in the nation-state (Onuma 1993: 264).

Both the Japanese government and leading Korean organisations regarded all Koreans in Japan as foreigners or sojourners despite the fact that their lives had already taken deep root in the country (Lie 2001: 108).

Kelly (1993: 192) argues the importance of analysing how government policies and people's choices have contributed to the incorporating and differentiating effects of institutions and ideologies in post-war Japan. As a result, this period has been characterised less by 'homogenisation' than by the 'standardisation' of diversity, enforced by governmental policies and reinforced by the choices people have made.

It should be emphasised that Japan has never been ethnically homogeneous. Between the fourth and eighth centuries, Chinese and Koreans frequently migrated and settled in the country, bringing with them foreign technology and culture. They were called Kikajin (naturalised people). Under rules of military regimes from the late twelfth to mid-nineteenth centuries, those who engaged in certain stigmatised occupations (e.g., leather workers, undertakers, executioners, scavengers, beggars and itinerants) were collectively treated as a distinct 'untouchable', even subhuman, population, that today comprises the two to three million Burakumin in Japan (Price 1967: 13). During the nation-building of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, territorial expansion incorporated two other ethnically distinct populations, today numbering 1.6 million Okinawans in Japan's far south, and the variously reported 25,000 to 300,000 Ainu indigenous to the far north (Lie 2001: 94).

Yoshino (1998: 13–14) calls this kind of nationalism 'secondary nationalism'. In contrast to 'primary nationalism', which is concerned with the creation of a nation's original identity, secondary nationalism emerges to preserve and enhance national identity in an already well-established nation.


This has had a significant impact on the Korean population because it opened a legal window through which children born of marriage between Japanese and Koreans could be Japanese citizens. By 1985 an estimated 70 per cent of marriages by second- and third-generation Koreans were to ethnic Japanese (Kang and Kim, cited by Lie 2001: 109).

In the late 1960s, when these allegedly labour-saving measures proved to be inadequate to alleviate labour shortages, Japan resorted to some attempts to recruit foreign workers from neighbouring Asian countries (Lie 2001: 10). But by 1975, OPEC's oil embargo had triggered a serious economic recession, and demands for labour quickly fell from high to minimal. The recession lasted for ten years, creating a surplus of labour until the mid-1980s (Bartram 2000: 26).

It is part of my broader sociological study of the Japanese Brazilian community in Hamamatsu and its vicinity, which began in 1993. To understand the 'return' migration experiences of Japanese Brazilians, between 1994 and 1995, I interviewed migrants in the Hamamatsu area and in São Paulo, Londrina and Porto Alegre, Brazil (Yamanaka 2000a). For four months in fall 1998, and several shorter periods thereafter, I lived in Hamamatsu (where I had spent much of my youth) in order to carry out this research on social interaction between local citizens and immigrants.

Because of a relatively high rate of interracial marriage in Brazil, the Japanese Brazilian population in Japan includes a substantial number of non-Nikkeijin Brazilian spouses of Nikkeijin Brazilians and their mestizos children.

This court ruling was front-page news in the New York Times on 15 November 1999 under the headline ‘“Japanese only” policy takes body blow in court’ (French 1999).

For example, in an interview with Newsweek magazine (2003: 51), Hisao Yasui, Director of the International Affairs Office of the Hamamatsu Municipal Government, said, 'Racial discrimination in Japan is not a kind of problem that the Western way of judging good or bad can solve. Taking up negative examples would only result in stirring Japanese nationalism.'

For example, in 2000, Hamamatsu City established the Foreign Citizens Assembly. There, selected members of the city's foreign communities discuss problems faced by foreign residents and present proposals to the city government. The effect of the Assembly on the city's policy-making is questionable, however, as many problems of concern to the Assembly, such as children's education and access to inexpensive health care, remain largely unsolved (Yamanaka 2003b, 2003c).

See Kashiwazaki (2000: 461–6) for further discussion of policy implications of the changing politics of citizenship in Japan.

References


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